The government that represents me has certain obligations over Afghanistan, some to me and some to the troops fighting there. The two sets of obligations are different. I require that a war should be necessary and successful. I doubt the war in Afghanistan was the former or is likely to be the latter, but other conclusions are tenable.

The invasion of Afghanistan was intended to root out Al Qaeda. It is difficult for a layman, and I suspect for anyone, to gauge what degree of threat and of what type Al Qaeda presents. My guess is that Al Qaeda is more a franchise than a coherent movement. I would guess that cells operate independently in different countries and do little more than appropriate the label. Those of a jihadist persuasion may have had their resolve strengthened by get-togethers at the camps in Afghanistan, and more recently in Pakistan. But I doubt the training they received amounted to much. The World Trade Centre destroyers were trained at the flying schools of Florida. The basic idea for an attack might come from bin Laden and his cronies but I doubt even that. The Mumbai outrage was planned and organised in southern Pakistan. Perhaps bin Laden suggested it but no more. Al Qaeda’s importance is that it exists and for that any bolthole will serve; the west cannot go to war to stopper them all.

The urge to war after 9/11 was understandable but not I think logical. The means were also understandable but fighting a proxy war through the northern warlords inevitable brought later problems. Those were simply ignored since the U S was not “into nation building”- a supremely foolish doctrine. Paddy Ashdown, who knows about such matters, has pointed out that there is an initial period of good-will where much can be accomplished. Lose that chance and the task becomes vastly more difficult and perhaps impossible.

What is the task? Belatedly we have come to set out some sort of war aim. It is to leave a stable government that will not harbour Al Qaeda. Creating a stable government is not in the realm of the possible. But the Taliban have no reason to wish to provide sanctuary for Al Qaeda and we can only hope that they will not. It is my belief that senior politicians and military commanders know Afghanistan is lost. Both groups want a face-saving way out but I cannot see one. Meanwhile soldiers die and wives weep.

That brings me to the troops. I am in an impersonal way sorry for the bereaved as I am for any who suffer loss. But I cannot generate particular anguish over the death of a soldier in combat. As we used to sing in my youth, “It serves you right. You shouldn’t have joined. It jolly well serves you right.” Ours is a mercenary army. Young men do not join to serve Queen and country. The recruiting adverts emphasize adventure, sport, camaraderie and access to sophisticated equipment. Armies are there to fight and that means trying to kill the enemy and them trying- and sometimes succeeding - in killing you. No one joining the army can be in any doubt about that. Nor can any recruit doubt that he must obey orders. There is no undertaking to provide the best equipment or sensible commanders, although I as a non-combatant can require both. A soldier cannot require that the war he is called upon to fight must be just or necessary. But I think he can require that he not be ordered to continue to risk his life when the decision has been made to get out. The most flagrant case was the armistice that ended the Great War. The announcement was delayed so that it could be made on the 11^th hour of the 11^th day of the 11^th month. Commanders knew that the armistice had been signed but some elected not to tell the troops. Some died as a result.

If the war in Afghanistan is both necessary and winnable, the level of casualties is far from excessive. As I have said anyone joining the army knows the risk. One soldier there said he now knew what it must have been like at Passchendale. Nonsense; the chance of being killed In Afghanistan is perhaps one in a thousand. At that level a soldier can think he would be unlucky to die. Someone going over the top at Passchendale knew he would be lucky to live. The ceremony attending the return of the dead, with flag draped coffins carried through crowd-lined streets and medals for the bereaved, inflates as extraordinary what should be routine. The intention I assume is to increase patriotic fervour, to emphasise the courage and sacrifice being made for our benefit. The result is likely to be the opposite; inflating the sacrifice risks makes it appear unjustified and unacceptable.

It will be said that we cannot just abandon the Afghans but I predict we will one day do just that. The U S abandoned the southern Vietnamese; it had no choice. Those in senior positions had known that there was no choice for some time yet bombing on a vast scale still went on. We have to wait and soldiers have to die until the public turn actively against the Afghan war and politicians untainted by the original decision are in power. I do not like it.

Could we have done better? We could scarcely have done worse. Far more troops at the outset, an imposed government structure with no corruption, immediate action on infrastructure, and on police and local army training, might have given the development of stable government and a secure country an outside chance. I think an outside chance it still would have been. No outside force has ever ruled Afghanistan nor, until the Taliban, an internal one either. As it was we allowed matters to drift letting a corrupt government emerge that though it depended on the western troops, proved difficult to control. Whether Paddy Ashdown could have achieved anything I doubt, but he would have tried and Kasai was not having that.

At a more fundamental level we the British have failed to create armed forces that meet the needs of the time. It has been clear for 20 years if not more, that our forces would not be called upon to fight an all out war. The only possible enemy was the USSR. That would have led to a nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the US. Our independent nuclear deterrent was neither independent nor a deterrent. We should have abandoned the vastly expensive nuclear capability, sophisticated fighter aircraft and so. The operations our forces have been called upon to undertake have been in the main against poorly equipped unconventional forces. The operations have had a large training and public order element. In Afghanistan we lack helicopters, well-protected vehicles and I would guess various items of sophisticated detection equipment under the general heading of remote sensing. Not cheap but of small cost when compared with an upgraded nuclear delivery system.

There is a belated recognition that a successful operation, not just in Afghanistan, requires more than the defeat of the enemy in combat. Success also requires the establishment of security, and that means getting the local population on side. But for that there must be an efficient and uncorrupt government and public service, and economic development. And it must all start at once. The various elements are so interrelated that I would have thought they ought best to come within one structure. The military should at least have a clear humanitarian, training and development role and be trained for those tasks. I have long thought such a multi faceted rapid reaction force to be needed but I detect only the beginnings of an appreciation of the fact.